A Comparative Study on Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations through the Window of Regional Integration Theories: Realism, Federalism, (Neo)-Functionalism, and Constructivism Paper prepared for presentation at the International Conference on “Democratic Consolidation and Peaceful Development,” sponsored by Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Mainland Affairs Council, National Checking University, Peace & Democracy Institute of Korea University, Howard International House, Taipei, May 5th, 2010.
Introduction: Similarities and Differences between Cross-Strait and Inter- Korean Relations Inter-Korean relations and Cross-Strait relations share several similarities. First, the two cases are the only remaining divided countries even after the collapse of Cold War. After the Second World War, East h federalist argument to Twain’s constructivist offensive to China. China adhered “One China principle. ” According to China, division and separation across the Strait was forced by Western colonial forces and it has been humiliating to Chinese people.
Therefore, the Chinese would accept the concept of “one nation” with no problem but would never accept “two states” and hat is why China has adhered firmly to “One China principle. ” Although Chinese leaders confirmed that China could not be divided, they accepted a federalist formula of “one state two systems” (?*lј]) as was the case in integrating Hong Kong to China 1997. Beijing enacted “Anti-Secession LaW’ on March 4, 2005 to demonstrate its determination to deter Taiwan independence even by using “non-peaceful meaner. Chinese government listed three conditions that should be satisfied if the government resort to “non-peaceful meaner”: 1) efforts taken by separatists to split Taiwan from China; 2) any major incidents that could lead Taiwan towards splitting from China; 3) the complete exhaustion of the possibility of peaceful unification (Philip yang, 2005). (5) Ma Yang Juju Government and the Neo-Functionalism Upon being elected president, Ma Yang Juju was told from the U. S. President Bush and Chinese President Huh that “1992 Consensus,” or “One China with different interpretations” shall be the key to the resumption of Cross-Strait talks.
At his first international press conference on March 23, 2008 Ma reiterated his Modus Veined approach to Cross Strait: “non-mutual denial” principle, the Three-nose policy to “no unification, no independence, no use of force,” together with Clew’s “Cross Strait common market. ” He said he would not send special envoy to China, and instead he will let a semi-public MONGO, the SAFE to negotiate directly with ARTS on economic, political and peace issues. Ma’s cross strait policies included long list of functionalist and neo-functionalist exchanges, cooperation and political deals.
After the inauguration of Ma Yang Juju presidency, opinion leaders in Cross-Strait countries and the U. S. Predicted the Cross-Strait negotiations would proceed into six stages: 1) Cross-Strait charter flights and direct flights; 2) the Cross-Strait economic and financial cooperation as well as investment and trade issues; 3) Twain’s participation in the Gigs and Nags as well as “mutual non-denial” in the diplomatic arena; 4) the promotion of “Cross-Strait common market and Twain’s participation in the East Asian economic integration; 5) political issues such as Peace Accord and CBS; 6) Most politically sensitive issue, I. . , Twain’s political status in relation to Mainland China and to the international society r “the political status of the Taiwan authorities”. Ma’s approach is a kind of neo-functionalism in the sense that non-governmental actors such as SAFE and ARTS have been key players in negotiation processes at the first round.
In their first 2008 meeting held at Attitude State Guesthouse, Beijing, the SAFE-ARTS agreed to initiate direct passenger airline service every weekend from July 4, 2008, to negotiate Cross-Strait direct flight, to establish direct communication procedures concerning air-traffic control, and to open Taiwan to mainland Chinese tourists.
In the second meeting between SAFE and ARTS held at November 3, 2008, Taipei, more advance agenda for Cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation were discussed such as direct maritime shipping, chartered cargo flights, direct postal service, and co-operation in ensuring food safety, direct freight service and opening up air routes that directly cross Taiwan Strait.
In the first stage of negotiations, semi-official but non-governmental MONGO played key role, then if the results that made through 1st stage spill over political affairs, then in the second stage, the two ruling parties in China and Taiwan, COP and KM especially maintained regular dialogues through the “KM-COP Forum” representing inter-party connections which played the role of “second rail” to maintain political understanding and to pursue political consensus between two countries across Taiwan Strait.
In the third stage, governments of respective countries would replace with Nags and political parties as the main negotiators in Cross-Strait affairs. As a consequence of Ma’s neo-functional strategies and policies, economic exchanges and political dialogues has increased substantially by growing economic interdependence, interpreter connections, elite interactions, unofficial military exchange, back-channel negotiations and sending secret envoys.
As was expected by functionalist theories, elite interactions, in particular, across Taiwan Strait contributed to mutual understanding, altered perception to the other side among participants, and thus, peace building across the Taiwan Strait (Wassermann, 2009). Tang Changes concluded that the current status of the Taipei, Beijing and Washington trilateral relations has been transformed from Dimmer’s model of a “romantic triangle” to a “m©engage a trios.
Sino-American cooperation has never been progressed so smoothly because in the critical time of global financial crisis there is too much at stake for the two countries to be at odds over Taiwan. While Taiwan President Ma’s calling Cross-Strait ties as “special relations” is a clear break with the “special state to state” proposed by Lee Tent-huh in 1999 and “one state on each side of Taiwan Strait” (?¤l) proposed by Chem. Shush-ban in 2002, Ma’s “special relations” fits quite well into Chinese model of cross strait relations.
During Ma presidency, even though Taiwan and China cannot recognize each other, they can each at least a consensus on peaceful coexistence and mutual non-denial as proposed by President Ma (Tang, 2009). President Ma on December 1 5, 2008 lifted “Three Nose”(no trade, no transportation, no postal service) and resumed direct sea, air and mail links. It ended a six decades-long ban between the two sides on such trips. Business blossomed across the Strait and the economic interdependent and integration (Ell) across Taiwan Strait have reached exceptionally high level.
Ell has increased the level of cooperation and Cross Strait integration without any formal, official, and political agreement. Ma’s successful policies of economic interdependence and integration (Ell) without resorting to governmental level dialogues and exchanges confirm that the premises of functionalism are right. Nevertheless, the spill of economic integration over political sphere has been limited in the case of Cross-Strait relations. Still in the political sphere, there has been no sign of reconciliation even when Cross Strait economic links have been growing stronger day by day.
The phenomenon of “economic zeal, political chill” has been continuing despite high level of economic interdependence ND integration (Wassermann, 2009). Weak spill-over to political arena discomforts functionalist theory and asks for neo-functional package deal to dissipate economic integration into political integration and to construct organizations to institutionalize peaceful coexistence, I. E. , institutionalizing Ma’s “Three Nose policy of no reunification, no independence and no war” and thus maintain peaceful status quo between two countries across Taiwan Strait. . Concluding Remarks: Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations Compared During the Cold-War era, both two Koreans and two countries across Taiwan Strait did either talk each other nor exchange persons, goods and services, and ideas. Realist paradigm was overflowing in inter-Korean and Cross-Strait relations. Those divided states in East Asia fell into “security dilemma” and thereby, the role of the hub country, the U. S. In East Asian “hub and spokes system” stood out in East Asian security structure.
No space for inter-Korean and Cross-Strait talks and exchanges was allowed in the vertical security structure. Thawing of the vertical, rigid, inflexible, and confrontational security structure took place in Korean peninsula and between woo countries across Taiwan Strait with the end of the Cold-War. By mid-sass, South Korea caught up North Korea in terms of economic growth. Since then, South Korea has consistently claimed functionalism with its economic superiority over the North while North Korea shifted its unification policy and strategy from federalism to confederacies or “lower stage federalism. When North Korea had exceeded the South in terms of economic development before 1976, it had attempted to absorb South Korea by a federalist formula. Since South Korea gained ascendancy over North Korea, the North hold confederacies emphasizing centralization, independence, autonomy and survival of the weaker subunit, as the unification strategy of the North Korea. Even though federalism has remained as the North Koreans official strategy of unification, it has been Just empty rhetoric.
In Cross-Strait relations, China found functionalism well to attract trade, business investment, tourists from Taiwan while Taiwan rejected Chinese offers for more functionalist exchanges without recognizing Taiwanese sovereignty and, instead, Taiwan responded with non-functionalist policies such as “Three Nose policy. ” As China rose to economic super house in the world, Taiwanese investment and trade became no longer a critical leverage to enhance Twain’s position visa-¤-visa China.
Taiwan turned into one of countries which have been competing for huge Chinese market and thus Taiwanese businessmen who invested in China market pressured Taiwan government to ease regulations on investments in China and to promote and accelerate functionalist exchanges and cooperation with China. Compared to two Koreans, no official talks and summit meetings at government level took place between two countries across Taiwan Strait. However, despite no official government-level negotiations, deals and compromises, investment, trade, production, tourist visits and family reunions grew remarkably year by year.
Certainly both China and Taiwan have the wisdom to find a duplicities pragmatist solution in their Cross-Strait relations while two Koreans still has been sticking to ideologies of the cold war days. If two Korean governments hold firmly on their ideological principles, they could not move many steps forward accelerating economic exchanges and cooperation and reunion of separated families despite two Koreans had hold many talks, conferences, Joint escalations, and summit meetings.
Between Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait relations, significant differences have existed in terms of the amount of trade, investment, and personal exchanges (See Table 1-5). What has caused these differences? As explained above, Inter-Korean relations have been characterized by NATO, no action talks only, while Cross-Strait relations present a symptom of ANTA, no talk many actions. In Cross-Strait relations, functionalism has worked well, but Chinese functionalism has failed to advance toward neo-functionalism because the issue of Taiwan sovereignty is still being unresolved.
In Inter-Korean relations, the failure of Sunshine policy was regarded as the failure of functionalism. Functionalism can develop into neo-autonomics by institutionalizing economic and social exchanges and cooperation through political package deal and building organizations for dealing functionalist exchanges. Basic Agreement in 1991 and two Summit Meetings in 2000 and 2007 respectively were critical moments to leap forward from functionalism to neo-functionalism.
However, the current Lee Among Back administration turned the clock of reunification back to the cold war era. In new government’s unification policies, spill-back, disengagement, and conditional engagement have appeared as the key elements of Lee Among Basks unification policy and those negative elements caused regression from functionalism and neo-functionalism to realism of Cold War days. China had also the similar moment of anti-unification policies and strategies during Chem. Shush-ban presidency.
The former president of Taiwan, Chem. Shush-ban, emphasized Taiwanese identity based on negative constructivism under the circumstance of asymmetric power relations with China and insisted independence room China. After all, we would like to close our presentation by summarizing generalized patterns of integration of divided countries from our observation on Cross-Strait and Inter-Korean relations. We make a figure with two key elements that decide the pattern of integration, that is, balance of power and ethnic identity.
The element of balance of power is divided by symmetrical vs.. Asymmetrical balance of power while the element of ethnic identity is divided by homogeneous ethnic identity vs.. Heterogeneous ethnic identity. With these elements, we can draw a ex. figure. Box 1 is he combination of homogeneous ethnic identity with asymmetrical balance of power which produces functionalism and nonfunctional of the stronger and confederacies of the weaker and fits well to Inter-Korean relations, 1988-present and Cross-Strait relations, 2008-present.
Box 2 is the combination of symmetrical balance of power and homogeneous ethnic identity which produces confederacies vs.. Functionalism and fits well to Inter-Korean relations, 1960-1980. Box 3 is the combination of Heterogeneous ethnic identity and asymmetrical balance of power which produces conversation of federalism of the stronger and constructivism of the eager and fits well into Cross-Strait relations, 1996-2008.
Lastly, Box 4 is found neither in Inter-Korean relations nor in Cross-Strait relations in post World War period. Box 4 is the pattern of integration created by the combination of symmetrical balance of power and Heterogeneous ethnic identity. Box 4 is the worst combination with regard to integration of divided countries because it would likely generate separatist movements and eventual cessation of unified federation into subunits. We found Box 4 type case in the separation of Czechoslovakia into Czech Republic and
Slovakia Republic soon after Czechoslovakia freed itself from Soviet Empire in 1991 From this Figure 1, we can draw a tentative conclusion that Box 1 as the combination of homogeneous ethnic identity and asymmetrical balance of power between divided countries is the most propitious tort reunification or reintegration to divided countries. The current configuration of Inter-Korean relations and Cross-Strait relation share many characteristics of Box 1 and therefore we are cautiously optimistic for the prospects of reuniting of two Koreans and of two countries across Taiwan Strait.